Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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CLUSTER TWO: ARTICLE VII

Submitted by New Zealand

Proposed elements for inclusion in report of the Preparatory Committee on the work of its first session

(i) States parties reaffirm their conviction that nuclear-weapon-free zones are important disarmament measures which enhance regional and global peace and security, greatly strengthen the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects and contribute to the objective of securing a world entirely free of nuclear weapons;

(ii) States parties welcome the conclusion of two further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties (the treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok) and the recent entry into force of the latter;

(iii) States parties reaffirm the importance of the cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their support for the relevant protocols to the treaties. In this context they welcome the signature by all nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. They look forward to the signature and ratification of the relevant Protocols by those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so;

(iv) The States parties welcome the consultation which is currently under way between the nuclear-weapon States and the South-East Asian States in relation to the Protocols to the Treaty of Bangkok and urge those States to make every effort to resolve the remaining differences in order to facilitate adherence to the Protocols;

(v) The States parties welcome the intention of States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, and to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation.

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JAPAN

Some possible elements to be taken into account in the review process

I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. It is important for the States parties to reconfirm the crucial role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The States parties should reconfirm that the stability of the Treaty regime is essential to the maintenance of world peace and security.

2. The new NPT review process is qualitatively different from past efforts. The decisions taken at the NPT Extension and Review Conference in 1995 require that the review process contribute to the promotion of full implementation of the Treaty and its universality, and particularly to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

3. Substantive aspects of the preparatory work must be fully considered in addition to making procedural preparations for the Review Conference.

4. The task of the Preparatory Committee is to review the operation and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. But it is also important to take fully into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, especially the decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".

5. It would not be useful to aim at achieving a consensus document at each Preparatory Committee meeting. Rather, the most appropriate and productive procedure would be for the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee meeting to issue a summary report, under his or her sole responsibility, with necessary annexes.

6. The final report, to be submitted to the Conference by the Preparatory Committee, should be prepared at the last Preparatory Committee meeting. It should include two parts, one reviewing the Treaty, and the other recommending measures for the future.

7. A revision of the document on "Principles and objectives" would not be desirable, since it was the product of arduous negotiations pursued at the 1995

Review and Extension Conference and it stands on its own. Rather, it is important to strive to agree on a new set of objectives.

8. As the matter of overlap in the discussions of issues by the three Committees established during the past Review Conference is noted in paragraph 5 of the decision on "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty", appropriate attention should be paid to this matter by the Preparatory Committee.

II. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

9. The ultimate goal in nuclear disarmament is the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. Towards this end, it is important to accumulate steadily, one by one, realistic and effective disarmament measures, taking into account the realities of the international security environment.

10. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a major step in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, especially as a means of constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of preventing the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary for all States signatories, by contributing to the work of the CTBT Preparatory Committee, to make steady efforts to establish the CTBT regime, including verification systems. All signatories should strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty. Those States which have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty are urged to do so at the earliest possible date.

11. Now that the CTBT has been concluded, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is the next step in nuclear disarmament. It is regrettable that negotiations on FMCT have not yet commenced in the Conference on Disarmament. All means should be explored to realize the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

12. Systematic and progressive efforts pursued by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally are an important element in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI. The commitment made by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation at the Helsinki summit meeting to further reduce, in the context of the START process, their strategic nuclear arms by the year 2007, is most welcome.

13. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by each nuclear-weapon State are further encouraged. In light of General Assembly resolution 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", every nuclear-weapon State is invited to inform the international community of the activities and progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. These efforts would contribute to transparency and confidence-building.

14. The efforts of the international community to promote and assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the management and disposal of fissile materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons should be further encouraged.

15. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider further steps such as gradually taking nuclear forces off alert and/or removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.

16. The importance of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States of the NPT regime is fully recognized. Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the "Principles and objectives".

17. In the light of recent encouraging developments, it is important to reaffirm that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.

18. Great progress has been made towards the ultimate goal of the universality of the NPT. The States parties should unite their efforts to encourage States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it as soon as possible. It would be useful to promote dialogue and confidence-building among the countries concerned so as to improve their regional security environment.

III. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

19. It is noteworthy that a model protocol on measures of the second part of the "Programme 93+2" was adopted in the Drafting Committee to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards. It is strongly hoped that this model protocol will be adopted by the IAEA Special Board of Governors in May.

20. Efforts should be strengthened to increase the effectiveness and transparency of export control systems through the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Zangger Committee.

21. The entry into force, in October 1996, of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is a welcome development. The Group of Experts is to be commended for its tireless efforts to finalize the draft text of a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Group's recommendation that a diplomatic conference be convened with a view to adopting the Convention is also worthy of support.

22. It is important that the transport of nuclear materials should be conducted in a safe and secure manner and in compliance with the safety standards of IAEA and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), while navigational rights and freedoms as provided for in the applicable rules of international law should not be impaired.

IV. SOME PROCEDURAL ISSUES

23. New York should be the venue of all Preparatory Committee meetings as well as the Review Conference itself, in order to facilitate the participation of a large number of States. It should also be noted that the cost of conference services is much lower in New York than in other cities.

24. It is necessary and important to keep the costs of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference reasonably low. Thus it is recommended that the length of each background document be limited to a specific number of pages. The necessity of issuing summary records of the meetings of the Preparatory Committee should be carefully considered, and if records are issued, the number should be limited to the minimum.

25. The formula for apportioning the costs of the review process should follow established precedent. This means that the nuclear-weapon States, which have a special status under the Treaty, would be responsible for 55 per cent of the costs.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1997 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WORKING GROUP ON DISARMAMENT OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

On behalf of the Group of States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Disarmament of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, I have the honour to enclose herewith the document entitled "Views of the States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and other States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the 2000 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings" (see annex). It contains various aspects related to the Treaty that are of paramount importance to the present and subsequent Preparatory Committee meetings as well as the 2000 Review Conference.

It would be highly appreciated if you could circulate the present letter and its annex as an official document of the Preparatory Committee.

(Signed) Nugroho WISNUMURTI

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ANNEX

Views of the States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and other States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the 2000 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings

I. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

General views

1. The forthcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be the harbinger of a new era in our continuing endeavours to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized and thereby fulfil the commitments undertaken by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of Parties to the Treaty.

2. The decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constitute a single integral undertaking. This integrality should be maintained and respected.

3. The Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The international community should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

4. At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia:

(a) The achievement of universality of the Treaty;

(b) The conclusion of legally binding instruments to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(c) A ban on fissile materials and other nuclear devices for weapon purposes;

(d) The elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which must be accorded priority;

(e) The establishment of nuclear-free zones;

(f) The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties without exception.

5. Significant progress has been achieved in recent years in disarmament: inter alia the conclusion and the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; adoption and the commencement of the preparatory process for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, adoption of an amended Protocol II and Protocol IV of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; the conclusion of the treaties on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty), which effectively mean that the entire southern hemisphere is covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries continues to believe that many important and significant tasks remain ahead of it, particularly on the shaping of the future agenda for nuclear disarmament.

6. The purpose of the upcoming meeting of the Preparatory Committee would be to consider ways to promote full implementation of and universal adherence to provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to make recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. The Preparatory Committee meetings should make substantive contributions, taken into account by the 1995 decisions on "Strengthening the review process" and "Principles and objectives" in order to enable the Review Conference to evaluate the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and identify the areas in which further progress should be sought in the future.

7. The preparations for the 2000 Review Conference provide an opportunity for the realization of the objectives enshrined in the Treaty. For the successful outcome of the Review Conference substantive preparation should be made by the Preparatory Committee meetings in order to elaborate rolling texts to be submitted for consideration by the Conference, as basis for its final document. In this context, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries offers its preliminary views, which consist of the following:

Universality

8. The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty.

9. The Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference should consider ways and means to achieve the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities.

Non-proliferation

10. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The international community should make all the possible efforts to prevent the

proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament

11. States parties should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

12. The nuclear-weapon States should express their commitment to undertake a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons.

Security assurances

13. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. In this regard, there is no objection, in principle, in the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly, to the idea of an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Hence, the States parties should agree to negotiate, in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the 2000 Review Conference on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the 2000 Review Conference as a protocol annexed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Fissile material

14. States parties support the establishment of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament. It would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.

Safeguards

15. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are an essential element in providing a guarantee that States are complying with article III undertakings. All States parties that have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguard agreements required by article III of the Treaty.

16. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source of special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope safeguards.

17. Nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

18. The inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination must be reaffirmed by all nuclear and non-nuclear States parties alike. It is also essential that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties be fully guaranteed. States parties should reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.

19. Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.

20. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking into account particularly the needs of developing countries.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

21. Taking into account article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference relating to the establishment of such zones, States parties should express support on measures taken by a State party or group of States parties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and support proposals to establish these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regimes and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties should welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

22. The States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation,

including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.

The resolution on the Middle East

23. It has to be noted that no progress has been achieved in the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Preparatory Committee meetings should follow up on the implementation of the provisions of this resolution with a view to reporting to the Review Conference on the progress achieved in this regard.

24. Since the adoption of the resolution, new realities have emerged in the Middle East pertaining to adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. With the latest accession of United Arab Emirates, Djibouti and Oman, it is now a reality that all States of the Middle East have become parties to the Treaty with the exception of Israel.

25. The Movement of Non-Aligned States are convinced that the implementation of this resolution should proceed as soon as possible with a view to enhancing the universality of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. In this regard, the meetings of the Preparatory Committee should welcome the latest accessions to the Treaty and call upon Israel to accede to it without further delay as well as to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

26. Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee should recommend ways and means to get all parties directly concerned to engage seriously in undertaking practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, a zone which should be freely arrived at among regional States.

27. The depository States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a special responsibility in this regard, as co-sponsors of the draft resolution submitted for adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and as the resolution constitutes part and parcel of the package of the outcome composed of three decisions and the resolution.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

28. Taking the above into consideration, the upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee could be organized as follows:

(a) On substantive discussions, attention should be focused on issues of concern to all States parties, utilizing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the decisions taken in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as the yardsticks in determining the objectives to be achieved by the Review Conference to be held in the year 2000. It should be discussed in a structured, coherent and focused manner in order to obtain the maximum results as to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference;

(b) The formulation of recommendations to be considered by the Review Conference shall not replace the evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since the Conference in 1995. The States parties to the Treaty should start negotiations in the first Preparatory Committee on a rolling text on the implementation of all the articles and preamble of the Treaty;

(c) States parties of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons welcome the participation of non-governmental organizations, which could also make a positive contribution towards the attainment of these objectives.

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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY PARTIES IN THE REVIEW PROCESS

Submitted by the Marshall Islands

1. The Republic of the Marshall Islands is the current Chairman of the South Pacific Forum (SPF), and wishes to highlight some of the positions taken by the Forum. Different ideas and aspects that shape our views of disarmament in general and non-proliferation will be brought forward. The Forum will make further views available as deliberations become more focused.

1995 Review Conference

2. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons took a historical first step down the path towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. The indefinite extension of this Treaty was a fundamental decision, which would greatly assist in the furtherance of international security and global cooperation. The Conference gave participants high expectations and the hope that finally there would be comprehensive global cooperation in all related fields under the Treaty. Our hopes were not entirely satisfied.

Nuclear testing

3. At its last meeting in Majuro, Marshall Islands, SPF expressed satisfaction at the permanent cessation of French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. This marked the end of all nuclear testing in a region that had been subjected to both atmospheric and underground testing for five decades. China's announcement of a moratorium on nuclear testing meant that all five nuclear-weapon States are now observing testing moratoria, long urged by the Forum. In 1996, the General Assembly took action to adopt and open for signature a comprehensive test-ban treaty, an effort fully supported by the Forum. The resolution was co-sponsored by all the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Forum.

4. The leaders of the Pacific region also warmly welcomed the signature and ratification by Vanuatu of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the signature of Tonga, and the signing of the Protocols to the Treaty by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. As a result of these developments, all States within the Treaty area have now given their support to the Treaty, and all five nuclear-weapon States have undertaken to respect its provisions. The ratification by France of

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the Protocols is welcomed. The Forum also urged early ratification of the Protocols by the United Kingdom and United States.

5. It should be noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have now concluded the collection of samples from the nuclear-weapons-test site in French Polynesia. The expedition was conducted by 11 distinguished scientists, and we are encouraged that they appear to have been given fairly good access to the test sites. A preliminary report should be made available to concerned delegations.

Southern Hemisphere nuclear-free zone

6. The establishment of two nuclear-weapon-free zones - in South East Asia (Treaty of Bangkok) and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba) - is encouraging. Leaders in the Pacific region have noted with satisfaction that these developments represented progress with respect to the decisions accompanying the indefinite extension in 1995 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This is perhaps one area in which the resumption of nuclear testing in the Pacific had a catalytic effect, inspiring the leaders of those regions to safeguard themselves against the calamity which has and was visited upon the Pacific.

Responsible efforts to address contamination

7. The Forum leaders at their last meeting reaffirmed the existence of a special responsibility towards those peoples of the former United Nations Trust Territory administered by the United States, the Marshall Islands, who had been adversely affected as a result of nuclear-weapons tests conducted during the period of the Trusteeship Agreement. This responsibility included safe resettlement of displaced human populations and the restoration to economic productivity of affected areas. This is a matter of extreme importance to the Marshall Islands. There is great concern that urgent progress needs to be made. Gratitude has been expressed that some steps have been taken by the former administrative power, and the Clinton Administration should be commended for their efforts. The Government of the Marshall Islands will remain actively engaged with the United States. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the international community was seen to have an acknowledged role to play, and we would welcome further assistance and interest. Some interest has been shown by the various organs of the United Nations, but much more needs to be done.

8. Reference should be made to so-called peaceful use of nuclear energy, from the point of view that all who wish to pursue nuclear energy for power production should be free to do so. Provided that there is strict compliance with the safeguards that have been amply outlined by several delegations. These countries have that right. But the Marshall Islands wishes to stress precaution, and the need to protect the environment from dangerous pollution.

International Court of Justice opinion

9. The advisory opinion tendered by the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be recalled, which recognized that all members of the international community have an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear

disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. All States concerned are urged, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to engage seriously in meaningful negotiations with a view to early further significant reductions of nuclear stockpiles as a step towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Concrete actions for the future

10. Our outlook for these coming negotiations is framed by these considerations. 1995 started with a very positive and expectant international negotiating climate. Progress was temporarily taken off the right track by some irresponsible actions, but the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and the start-up of work in that field should give the right impetus for action under this negotiating committee. As noted above, the opinion of the International Court of Justice is a very significant one, and it is only through thorough consideration that the right path will be found and the political will to follow-up on the Court's advice. Constructive engagement with the nuclear powers towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is therefore needed. All delegations should take note of the significant and encouraging statements coming from the recent Helsinki summit meeting. Of course this is a preliminary effort, but the international community must support all such efforts that will make progress towards a safer world.

11. Those countries who aspire to becoming nuclear-weapon States also must be discouraged actively from such pursuits. Non-proliferation will not be made any easier by their actions. However, their security needs must be assured, and we will look at how the review process can be strengthened for this purpose. The need to assess current verification procedures with a view to making these more stringent and effective must be looked into. This is also a distinct part of our review. We agree entirely with those delegations that have expressed support for the crucial work on IAEA Programme 93+2 and would like to see more of these initiatives.

12. Accelerated work on a cut-off treaty on fissile materials is required. The Marshall Islands has supported this in the past, and are heartened to see that so many influential countries have taken up the issue also. This would be a significant advancement if successful.

13. Negotiations, as a matter of some urgency, on a nuclear-weapons convention should commence. Such a convention would take us closer to the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons under international verification and control. This could be assisted through the establishment of an intersessional working group. Because we need to remind the nuclear-weapon States that if progress is not made towards this goal of elimination, then we fear that the whole system of non-proliferation might be at risk. For the future work of this Committee we must look closely at this danger, as well as focus on other substantive issues such as safeguards, liability, cooperation between nuclear-free zones. We note the helpful views expressed by the United States delegation earlier.

14. The Marshall Islands reserves the right to come back with more details on these issues, as well as other related matters as the debate progresses.

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CLUSTER TWO

Submitted by Mongolia

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

1. Mongolia welcomes the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, as well as the ongoing efforts to establish new zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region or subregion concerned, which would promote global and regional peace and strengthen international security. In this respect, full support should be given to the creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Central Asian subregion, by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000, as expressed in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

2. Creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones within the boundaries of individual States complements the obligations undertaken by the States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, by prohibiting within such zones deployment of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, the dumping of radioactive wastes and the like, they expand the geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

3. Mongolia's declaration of its territory as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992, which has been welcomed and supported by all nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, has demonstrated that the creation of such zones within the boundaries of single States (single-state zones) is, in general, politically acceptable. For nuclear-weapon-free zones to be effective, irrespective of their geographical scope, they should be based on international agreement(s), have clearly defined rights and obligations of parties to such agreement(s), a system of verification and control to guarantee compliance with the obligations derived from such status, the assurances from parties to the agreements, etc. Therefore, in order for single-state zones to have equal legal basis with other zones, the objectives, purposes and principles, as well as the status of the zones, should be clearly defined in international agreement(s), taking duly into account the experience of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the specifics of single-state zones. The interests of neighbouring States should also be duly taken into account.

4. Bearing in mind the important role that single-state zones could play as concrete disarmament and confidence-building measures in widening the geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and thus contributing to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mongolia believes that the Preparatory Committee should focus specifically on this question and contribute to developing practical procedures in institutionalizing such forms of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States concerned with their neighbours as well as the nuclear-weapon States.

5. The delegation of Mongolia is prepared to enter into consultations on this and related issues with other members of the Preparatory Committee and other participants of the sessions of the Committee.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER ONE

Submitted by Norway

1. Norway believes there would be merit in voluntary measures to increase transparency on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Transparency as a confidence-building measure should apply to all States with a nuclear capability, but for obvious reasons the primary burden would fall on the nuclear-weapon States.

2. A fundamental prerequisite for transparency would be the application of consistent and strict standards of accounting and secure handling and storage procedures for fissile material at the national level.

3. Voluntary transparency measures of this character would facilitate negotiations on a "cut-off" treaty as well as any future talks on nuclear disarmament.

4. The following measures could be considered for successive implementation:

(a) All nuclear-capable States would submit information on their stocks, if any, of weapons-grade fissile material;

(b) Cooperative international measures would be put into place in order to clarify and confirm these declarations;

(c) The nuclear-weapon States, or any State that submits information on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, could permit inspection of such holdings. The aim would be to ensure that the inventory in storage can only be withdrawn for non-weapons purposes;

(d) Agreed monitored net reductions from stockpiles could be envisaged.

97-10013 (E) 140497 150497

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/14
14 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER TWO: ARTICLE VII

Submitted by Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

Proposed elements for inclusion in the report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

1. Significant progress has been made since 1995 in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia and in the growth of support for nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions.

2. In realization of the recommendations contained in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are especially pleased to note that on 28 February 1997 they formally endorsed, in the Almaty Declaration, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. This joint action, following earlier initiatives by several countries of the region, is indicative of the importance the States of Central Asia attach to article VII of the Treaty and paragraphs V to VII of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

3. As the States parties to the Treaty prepare for the next Review Conference in the year 2000, the Preparatory Committee takes positive note of this development.

97-10083 (E) 140497 150497

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/15
14 April 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: CHINESE/ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

PROPOSALS FOR INCLUSION IN THE REPORT ON THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Submitted by China

The Chinese delegation would like to present the following proposals for inclusion into the recommendation section of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference on its first session:

Cluster one: implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances

1. The nuclear-weapon States concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence; the States with large nuclear arsenals should further reduce drastically their nuclear stockpiles, and should destroy the removed nuclear warheads rather than simply transfer them from deployment to storage.

2. All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and to conclude a legally binding international instrument to that effect.

3. No country should develop and deploy space weapon systems or missile defence systems that undermine strategic security and stability.

4. States with nuclear weapons deployed outside their borders should bring all these weapons home.

5. The States that have not yet signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty are urged to do so at an early date, and all signatory States should strive to achieve the early entry-into-force of the Treaty.

6. All States should work for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

97-10089 (E) 140497

7. An international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision should be concluded through negotiations with the participation of all States.

8. All States should support the efforts of the non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at and in the light of the actual conditions of the regions concerned. All nuclear-weapon States should pledge their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect their status and undertake corresponding obligations.

9. All nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude, at an early date, legally binding international instruments to that effect.

Cluster two: implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards

10. In order to facilitate the Treaty's function in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, the States parties should continue to support the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

11. All States parties should support the IAEA programme for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. The nuclear-weapon States should apply those measures provided for in the model protocol that each of them identifies as capable of contributing to the nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

Cluster three: implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy

12. All States parties should make every effort to facilitate international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States that are in a position to do so should assist the developing countries to master technologies for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. All States parties should ensure that measures taken by them to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation would facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of the legitimate rights of the developing countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those restrictions on the transfer of technologies for peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are beyond safeguards required under the Treaty should be removed.

Universality of the Treaty

14. All States parties should strive for the achievement of the universality of the Treaty.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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14 April 1997

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First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Submitted by Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan

1. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, non-nuclear-weapon States have expressed concern for their security. They have consistently called for the conclusion of a legally binding instrument, providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To secure such security assurances and to conclude an international legal instrument thereon is a legitimate aspiration of non-nuclear-weapon States.

2. Paragraph 20 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the first special session devoted to disarmament, underscores the importance of effective measures of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war as deserving the highest priority among measures of arms limitation and disarmament. In paragraphs 32 and 59 of the same document the Assembly also reaffirms the need for effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

3. Following the demise of the cold war, positive changes have taken place in the international political climate. As a consequence, the world has witnessed the conclusion of a number of significant arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The precedents of the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the beginning of the process of nuclear disarmament by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, and the measures taken by other former Soviet Republics in the framework of complete nuclear disarmament demonstrate clearly that nuclear disarmament is not only within the realm of practical implementation, but it is also achievable in the foreseeable future, if only the political will exists. Apparently, less reliance is now being placed by nuclear-weapon States on the role of nuclear weapons. This process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons should be continued and carried forward as a significant step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

4. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on many occasions has reiterated the belief that, in order to be effective and lasting, the approach towards international security should be non-discriminatory and balanced and should seek security for all through total nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework, elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and progressive measures of reduction of conventional arms. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries also stressed that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States can contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons and has urged the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate, as a matter of priority, an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to undertake negotiations for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

5. The delegations of Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan attach the utmost importance to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It is their conviction that the only completely effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lie in the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of these weapons. Existence of nuclear weapons in itself constitutes a threat to international security and a factor which encourages proliferation. For this reason, and pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against these weapons, and to elaborate measures and arrangements which can contribute positively towards achieving the most effective regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.

6. These States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe that international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should cover both negative and positive security assurances.

7. They consider that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have a legitimate right to receive legally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

8. In this context, these States parties consider that the unilateral declarations made by the four nuclear-weapon States, and Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 and 984 (1995) of 4 November 1995 on security assurances have not fulfilled the requirements of non-nuclear-weapon States.

9. In May 1995, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted decisions on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on the extension of the Treaty, and a resolution on the Middle East.[1] In the decision on principles and objectives, the Conference, inter alia, called upon the States parties to consider further steps on security assurances that could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

10. Accordingly, the delegations of Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan consider that the time is now opportune to negotiate and conclude a protocol to the Treaty, providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. These States parties, therefore, propose a draft protocol to the Treaty on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The text of the protocol is annexed hereto.

12. These States parties are of the view that all States parties to the Treaty must take effective measures for nuclear disarmament, a ban on fissile materials, conclusion of an international legally binding instrument providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and universal adherence to the Treaty. With regard to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, these States parties urge the Preparatory Committee to address this issue in a substantive manner with a view to concluding a protocol to the Treaty, not later than the time of the convening of the 2000 Review Conference. The draft protocol, proposed by the States parties, will provide a basis for negotiations at the Conference or at the Preparatory Committee meetings.

13. These States parties firmly believe that conclusions of such a protocol on security assurances constitute an essential element of an effective regime of the Treaty, will strengthen the Treaty and will contribute to the success of the 2000 Review Conference.

Notes

[1] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex.

ANNEX

Draft protocol on security assurances to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Convinced that the only effective and credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of these weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that the principle of undiminished security for all States requires effective measures of such legally binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States,

Considering that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have the legitimate right to receive legally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them,

Recalling the three decisions and one resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[a] including the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which, inter alia, called upon the States parties to take further steps on security assurances that could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument,

Reaffirming their undertaking to observe strictly the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the present protocol is an annex, and their determination to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty by all States,

Bearing in mind the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recalling their obligations to refrain, in their mutual relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political

independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

I. DEFINITIONS

The terms "nuclear-weapon States" and "non-nuclear-weapon States" referred to in the present protocol refer to the definitions given in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

II. BASIC OBLIGATIONS

1. In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, each State party to the Treaty undertakes to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against another State party, its territorial integrity and its political independence.

2. The nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

III. MEASURES IN CASE OF NON-COMPLIANCE

1. Any State party that has reason to believe that there has been or is likely to be a breach of the obligations of States parties arising from Article II of this instrument may request an urgent meeting of a Conference of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or that of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to preventing such a breach, or redressing the situation arising therefrom.

2. In the case of a nuclear aggression or a threat of such an aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Conference of States Parties should provide to it the necessary help and assistance.

IV. DURATION

The duration of the present protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the protocol is an annex.

V. ENTRY INTO FORCE

The present protocol shall enter into force for the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification with the depositary Governments of the Treaty.

Notes

[a] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/16/Corr.1
16 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Submitted by Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan

Corrigendum

1. The titles of document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/16 should read as above.

2. Paragraph 5

The first sentence should read

5. The delegations of Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan attach the utmost importance to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

3. Paragraph 10 should read

10. Accordingly, the delegations of Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan consider that the time is now opportune to negotiate and conclude a protocol to the Treaty, providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

97-10361 (E) 160497

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/17
15 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER ONE

Submitted by Ireland

Nuclear disarmament

1. The reaffirmation on the part of the nuclear-weapon States (joint statement of 8 April 1997 to the Preparatory Committee at its first session) that they will continue to pursue, with determination, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, is to be welcomed.

2. In order to reinforce confidence in the incremental approach to nuclear disarmament while helping to ensure the continuance of the improved international security environment created by the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this reaffirmation should now be elaborated.

3. In the context of the "systematic and progressive efforts" that they have agreed to pursue, the nuclear-weapon States should set out their perspective on the future steps they will take to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

97-10131 (E) 150497 160497

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/18
15 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER THREE

Submitted by Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

Proposed elements for inclusion in the report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

As noted in the report of Main Committee III of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was adopted by consensus, there have been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. The Preparatory Committee reiterates the 1995 Conference's call upon all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in those affected areas.

97-10137 (E) 150497 160497

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/19
15 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER TWO

Submitted by Belarus

Proposed language for inclusion in the report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

1. States parties recognize the growing importance and interest in utilizing the provisions of article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which affirms the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

2. States parties are convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, particularly in regions afflicted with international conflicts, enhances regional and global peace and security and, being conducive to the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, is in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

3. States parties confirm that nuclear-weapon-free zones constitute an important disarmament measure instrumental in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects.

4. States parties are inspired by the signing of the Treaties establishing the South-East Asian and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones which, together with such zones already in existence for Antarctica, the South Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean, henceforth make the entire southern hemisphere free of the development, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer or use of nuclear weapons.

5. States parties call upon all the parties concerned to initiate and continue, wherever appropriate, bilateral and multilateral consultations aimed at promoting an exchange of views among them on the possible ways and means of enhancing their contribution to the process of regional and global nuclear disarmament and strengthening international peace and security through concerted efforts.

6. States parties are encouraged by the historic events of the past few years that enhanced the atmosphere of trust, mutual respect and partnership among European States as well as the prerequisites for practical implementation of the idea to free the world of nuclear weapons, in particular the withdrawal of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from the territories of Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine and thus from the entire Central and Eastern European region, ranging from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

7. States parties acknowledge the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their effective efforts in nuclear disarmament and consistent fulfilment of their obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles, and note with satisfaction the significant contribution of those States to the strengthening of the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security.

8. States parties underline the importance of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones on the European continent as instrumental and conducive to further disarmament and welcome the intention of the interested European States to continue consultations aimed at further consolidating conditions conducive to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the centre of Europe.

9. States parties welcome the numerous previous endeavours and continuous post-war efforts by some Central and Eastern European States aimed at promoting the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on their continent as a goal that is in complete consonance with the United Nations aspiration for a world without nuclear weapons.

10. States parties call on the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any actions that might jeopardize the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and damage the perspectives of establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones. It further calls on them to assist in every way possible in the establishment of such zones and to give early consideration to the signing of the relevant protocols once concluded, including undertaking to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty establishing the zone.

11. States parties urge all States of the region to declare solemnly that they will refrain from resorting to any means of acquiring nuclear weapons and from permitting the stationing on their territories or territories under their control of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

12. States parties request the Secretary-General to assist the countries concerned as well as all interested member States n their efforts to open up consultations and negotiations on issues related to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in new regions.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/20
16 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER ONE: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Submitted by Sweden

Proposed elements for inclusion in the report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

1. The States parties take note of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 and in particular the unanimous conclusion by the Court that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

2. The States parties welcome the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States in their joint statement of 8 April 1997 to the Preparatory Committee at its first session that they would continue to pursue, with determination, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. The States parties underline the importance that the specific steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their commitment be identified and fully implemented.

3. The States parties welcome the report of the Canberra Commission, which proposes a series of concrete measures towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, and commend the report for consideration in international disarmament forums with a view to exploring the possibilities of implementing the steps set out in the report.

97-10431 (E) 210497 220497

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC/I.21
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New York, 7-18 April 1997

PROPOSALS FOR INCLUSION IN THE REPORT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Submitted by the Russian Federation

Sharing the provisions contained in the document of the five nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/2), the delegation of the Russian Federation proposes to include into the recommendation section of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference on its first session the following proposals, also presented among others in its statements in the Preparatory Committee:

(a) That an exchange of views and negotiations be begun on a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States, taking into account the specific nature of their nuclear arsenals and possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments;

(b) That the nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon States should be stationed only within their own territories.

97-10437 (E) 210497 230497